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Target-Date Funds in 401(k) Retirement Plans
Olivia S. Mitchell and Stephen P. Utkus
Individual responsibility for portfolio construction has long been central to defined
contribution (DC) pensions in the United States, particularly in 401(k) retirement plans. 1 The
employer offering a 401(k) plan is responsible for selecting the plan’s menu of investment
offerings, but employees retain ultimate responsibility for portfolio construction. Nonetheless,
an ongoing concern with such arrangements is that many participants seem ill-equipped to make
such decisions, whether due to lack of financial sophistication or behavioral biases in decisionmaking. 2

Over the past decade, one response to this concern in the retirement saving

marketplace has been the introduction of investment offerings known as target-date funds
(TDFs) in 401(k) plans. These funds aim to simplify employee investment decision-making and
delegate important portfolio choices to investment managers selected by the employer.
Target-date funds consist of a series of investment offerings with portfolio allocations
described in terms of an expected year of retirement. The funds are usually offered in five-year
increments (e.g., a 2010, 2015, 2020, etc., fund); a typical series may include up to a dozen
funds. Participants making active choices can choose among these funds and other plan options;
defaulted participants are invested by the employer in a single target-date fund based on
employees’ current ages and assumed retirement dates. In what is often referred to as the “equity
glide path,” equity allocations are highest for young participants farthest from retirement (e.g. the
2050 fund) and lowest for those approaching and in retirement (e.g. a current-dated option such
as the 2010 fund). Once a participant’s account is invested in a given target-date fund, his
portfolio equity share is lowered over time due to age-related rebalancing by the fund manager
(who also handles all other portfolio management decisions). Target-date funds have grown
rapidly in the U.S. From 2000 to 2010, assets rose from $6 to $245 billion, and 70% of DC plans

1

Here we use the term 401(k) plans to refer broadly to private-sector defined contribution plans which can include
profit-sharing, money purchase, and 403(b) plans along with 401(k) plans. The importance of 401(k) plans in the
retirement portfolio is discussed by Samwick and Skinner (2004).
2
See Benartzi and Thaler (2001), Lusardi and Mitchell (2007, 2011), and Mottola and Utkus (2008) for extensive
references.
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offered target-date funds and 36% of all DC plan participants held positions in these funds (as of
2010). 3,4
The growing use of target-date funds is influenced by two decision-making mechanisms.
First, encouraged by qualified default investment alternative (QDIA) regulations issued by the
U.S. Department of Labor in 2007, employers have added target-date funds to default
arrangements including automatic enrollment, reenrollment, and fund mapping frameworks. 5 In
such settings, participant contributions are directly invested in a fund designated by the
employer. Second, participants not subject to such default arrangements are also increasingly
investing in the funds on their own. In these active or voluntary choice settings, a participant’s
selection of a target-date fund delegates portfolio construction tasks to the fund’s manager.
Target-date funds offer three distinct portfolio features to investors, regardless of whether
the funds are chosen actively or by default.

The first is a portfolio “prepackaging” or

convenience feature, whereby contributions are directed to multi-asset class funds designed to be
“all-in-one” portfolios. The second entails a current portfolio allocation with a decision heuristic
based on the participant’s expected retirement age. This heuristic is arguably simpler than the
process of creating a portfolio from a list of individual equity, fixed income, and/or balanced
funds. A third feature is an age-based rebalancing service, whereby risk exposure is reduced
automatically over time by the fund manager. The rebalancing can be viewed as a form of
commitment device: with a current-day decision to invest in a target-date fund, the employee is
committed to a future portfolio risk-reduction strategy, implemented by the fund manager, which
the participant might otherwise fail to implement on his own.
3

See ICI (2011), Figures 7.8 and 7.22, and Holden, VanDerhei, Alonso and Bass (2011), Figure 22. Target-date
funds accounted for an estimated 10 percent of private DC plan assets in 2009. Total target-date fund assets,
including monies in DC plans, IRAs and elsewhere, grew from $9 billion in 2000 to $340 billion in 2010 (ICI,
2011). These data are based on mutual fund assets and do not include the growing pool of target-date assets
invested in collective trusts or commingled funds, used by larger retirement plans. In 2010 68% of DC participants
were offered target-date funds, and 53% of those offered invested in them (Holden et al., 2011). See also Vanguard
(2011) and Copeland (2011) for additional information on target-date fund adoption.
4
For other studies on target-date funds, see Agnew, Szykman, Utkus and Young (2011); Ameriks, Hamilton and
Ren (2011); Pagliaro and Utkus (2011); and Park (2009).
5
Eligible QDIAs under the 2006 Pension Protection Act include target-date funds, traditional balanced funds, and
managed account advice services. When a plan sponsor defaults a participant to a QDIA and follows regulatory
requirements for, among other items, notification and disclosure to participants, and offers a pre-emptive right for
participants to “opt out” to alternative investments, the sponsor receives so-called 404(c) protection for participant
portfolio choices, meaning there is a presumption that the employer is not liable for participant portfolio decisions
when they invest in the QDIAs. Irrespective of this fiduciary protection, the sponsor, as with all plan investments,
retains fiduciary liability for selecting and monitoring the QDIA itself.
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We seek to evaluate how the introduction of target-date funds influences patterns of both
adoption and portfolio construction within 401(k) plans. We draw on a longitudinal dataset from
a major 401(k) plan provider, which offers a unique natural experiment in which to observe the
funds’ evolution over the 2003-10 period. Target-date funds were available in our dataset to
more than two million participants in over one thousand DC plans by 2010. The longitudinal
nature of the dataset permits us to examine the complex dynamics of target-date behaviors over
time, including the distinct reactions of existing employees versus new hires to the funds’
introduction, and the effect of changing employer default policies. In the first part of the paper
we consider adoption patterns: who adopted the funds, whether they adopted them as a single
holding (“pure investors”) or combined them with other options (“mixed investors”), and how
default arrangements versus voluntary choice influenced adoption results. In the second part of
our paper, we consider changes in participant portfolios when target-date funds are adopted
voluntarily. For this analysis, we consider participants who actively switched to the new funds
when the funds are first introduced. This difference-in-difference analysis permits us to isolate
the treatment effects of target-date funds on portfolio composition, controlling for both observed
and unobserved differences in target-date investors.
We offer several new findings. First, we document the rising demand for target-date
funds among participants due to active choice, particularly among workers early in the lifecycle
Employees who make active choices are equally likely to use target-date funds as pure targetdate investors, or in combination with other funds as a mixed target-date investors; this suggests
that preferences for target-date features are not a binary, all-or-nothing, choice. Also, voluntary
adoption of target-date funds appears relatively invariant to market conditions over time and rose
slightly during the recent financial crisis.
Second, we show that a complex, default-based “choice architecture” is accelerating
demand for target-date funds, and it is an important way in which the responsibility for portfolio
choice transfers from workers to employers. 6 Consistent with prior research (e.g. Madrian and
Shea, 2001), automatic enrollment of new plan entrants into target-date funds raises adoption
rates by 81 percent relative to adoption rates among non-defaulted workers. Yet other defaultbased strategies adopted by employers can also have important—and sometimes even stronger
6

The term “choice architecture” was popularized by Thaler and Sunstein (2008) for a wide range of decision
settings, including the retirement or pension plan context.
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effects—on outcomes. For instance, the simple designation of a target-date fund series as the
default for administrative recordkeeping purposes raises adoption among new hires by a relative
55 percent—what we refer to as a “halo” effect just from the simple default assignment.
Moreover, when an employer re-enrolls participants from a prior default fund into a new targetdate default, adoption rises by a relative 71 percent; when discontinued funds are mapped into
target-date funds, target date fund adoption grows by a relative 166 percent.
Third, we demonstrate that the portfolios of participants who select target-date funds
when they are first offered undergo important changes upon adoption, suggesting that the funds
serve as a form of implicit investment advice for workers. 7

This implicit advice feature

represents a second mechanism by which responsibility for 401(k) portfolio selection is shifting
from workers to employers. Portfolio changes are most dramatic for pure (single-fund) targetdate investors: the difference in equity share between the youngest and oldest participants widens
by over 40 percent points. Younger participants can anticipate large increases in portfolio returns
and variances, and all investors can expect to benefit from sizeable reductions in nonsystematic
risk (the target-date funds in our sample are index-based). It is worth noting that participants
could have pursued these investment changes on their own but did not; they occurred only as a
result of the employer’s decision to introduce target-date funds to the plan menu. This finding,
along with our results on default effects, confirm that preferences around retirement portfolios
are rather malleable: many participants are accept third-party direction of their portfolios, either
by default or via simplified choice.
Following a brief overview of related research, we describe the complex decision-making
architecture involved in the introduction of target-date funds to 401(k) plans. We then develop
empirical models of target date adoption, followed by a difference-in-difference analysis of
portfolio changes for a sample of participants adopting target-date funds when first offered. We
conclude with a discussion of implications of findings for retirement policy and household
financial decision-making.

7

The term “advice” has specific legal meaning under employee benefit law. Here we use the term “advice” in a
practical sense, meaning reliance by the participant on the target-date fund as a portfolio choice.
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Related Prior Research
The concept of “choice architecture” refers broadly to the design of the decision
framework governing consumer choice (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). Behavioral elements of
decision-making in the retirement setting, such as the role of default arrangements for saving and
portfolio decisions, the impacts of inertia and procrastination, and the difficulty decision-makers
have with complex choice sets, are all related to this concept. In our context, it is highly relevant
to an analysis of the impact of default investment designations in retirement plans, as well as the
simplifying decision heuristic associated with choosing target-date funds.
Several prior studies have examined how defaults influence workers’ saving decisions
(c.f. Carroll, Choi, Laibson, Madrian and Metrick, 2009; Choi, Laibson, and Madrian, 2004;
Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick, 2003, 2006; Nessmith, Utkus and Young, 2007). Others
explore how defaults affect portfolio allocation and trading choices in retirement plans and
personal saving accounts (c.f. Agnew, Balduzzi and Sunden, 2003; Ameriks and Zeldes, 2004;
Benartzi, 2001; Benartzi and Thaler, 2001, 2002; Benartzi, Peleg and Thaler, 2007; Calvet,
Campbell, and Sodini, 2009; Mitchell, Mottola, Utkus and Yamaguchi, 2006a, 2006b;
O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999; 2001). Our research is most closely related to studies showing
that retirement plan investment menus can shape, or “frame,” individual portfolio allocation
patterns due to inertia or naïveté (c.f. Benartzi and Thaler, 2001, 2002; Huberman and Jiang,
2006; Brown, Liang and Weisbenner, 2007; Thaler and Sunstein, 2008; and Tang, Mitchell,
Mottola, and Utkus, 2010), or in reaction to excessive complexity (also known as “choice
overload;” c.f. Iyengar, Huberman, and Jiang, 2004; Iyengar and Kamenica, 2010). There is also
a related literature on whether participants making portfolio choices make investment errors, due
to investment illiteracy or behavioral biases (c.f. Barber and Odean 2001; Benartzi and Thaler,
2001, 2002; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007, 2011; Mottola and Utkus, 2008; Mitchell and Lusardi,
2011).
In what follows, we examine two aspects of choice architecture in the retirement saving
context, namely the effect of default investment designations on 401(k) portfolio choice,
encouraged by federal regulatory policy under the Pension Protection Act and implemented over
the past decade by employers in 401(k) plans; and the simplifying choice mechanism embedded
in target-date funds, whereby portfolio selection is reduced to the choice of an expected
retirement age.

6

401(k) Plan Menus and Participant Portfolios
Our analysis draws on data for employers sponsoring 401(k) plans who introduced targetdate funds over the period 2003-10.

The data are derived from the Vanguard 401(k)

recordkeeping system, and the target-date funds offered were Vanguard-designed target-date
funds. Table 1, Panel A, shows the range of target-date funds arrayed by their target maturity
dates; each involves a different mix of passively-managed U.S. equity (including large-, midand small-capitalization stocks), international equity (both developed and emerging markets),
and U.S. high-quality bonds. As of December 2010, for instance, total equity exposure in the
funds for younger participants averaged 90 percent (in the 2040 through 2055 Funds) versus 29
percent for older participants in the Income Fund (intended for retirees). 8
Table 1 here
Target-date funds have often been selected by employers as a replacement for (or in
addition to) so-called “static allocation” or risk-based asset allocation funds; the latter are prepackaged investment offerings where portfolios differ solely based on equity fractions with no
implied age glide path. 9 Panel B of Table 1 outlines how our 401(k) plans added target-date
funds over time, conditional on having had pre-existing static allocation offerings. In 47 percent
of the plans, target-date funds were introduced de novo, while in the remaining 53 percent of the
plans, participants had been previously offered static allocation funds. In the latter group, one set
of firms added target-date funds to a menu that included pre-existing static allocation funds,
while another set switched or “mapped” existing participant accounts from static allocation to
target-date funds. 10 Controlling on the prior presence of static allocation funds is important, as it
helps identify groups of employees with a taste for portfolio “prepackaging,” albeit without the
age-based equity glide path inherent in target-date funds.
8

The Vanguard funds are all indexed except for holdings of inflation-indexed bonds, which materially affect only a
small fraction of the portfolios of participants in retirement; accordingly we refer to the funds as indexed. Fees for
the funds were below 0.20% during the 2003-10 period; at the end of our analysis period, even lower-cost versions
of the target-date funds were introduced in certain large plans. During 2010 some target-date funds offered by other
investment managers were introduced into the sample, but they account for less than 1% of sample participants.
9
When static allocation funds are offered, participants are presented with a selection of three or more funds of
varying risk profiles (such as conservative, moderate, or aggressive). There is no age-based rebalancing. Defaulted
participants are typically allocated to a moderate- or low-risk portfolio at the employer’s direction.
10
In the case of mapping from static allocation to target-date funds, sponsors can either switch all participant static
allocation balances and contributions into the new funds, or allow existing balances to remain undisturbed while
switching future contributions into the new funds. In both cases, the new target-date allocations reflect the sponsor’s
decision to move the money, rather than representing an active employee election.
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To analyze adoption behavior, we developed a panel of 401(k) plans over the 2003-10
period which introduced target-date funds. By December 2010, the sample included 1,008 plans
offering target-date funds covering more than 1.8 million active participants. 11 Importantly, we
only include plans for which we observe plan and participant records both prior to and
subsequent to the introduction of the target-date funds. 12 We included all participants entering
and leaving the plans due to normal workforce turnover, so the number of participants totaled
over 2.2 million. Participants were observed monthly, so the total number of observations was
62.5 million.
The dataset includes several variables relevant to whether participants selected a targetdate fund actively or were defaulted to it through one or more means, as described in more detail
below. Participant demographic information includes 401(k) account balances, investment
holdings, and contribution patterns, as well as key socioeconomic characteristics including age,
sex, household income, job tenure, and non-retirement financial wealth. 13 We also have features
pertinent to plans’ investment menus offered, including the number and types of investment
funds along with other plan design details such as the availability of plan loans or employer
stock. Our dataset includes monthly returns for all investments offered over a 13-year period
(including the eight-year period under analysis as well as the preceding five years).
Table 2 summarizes characteristics of the plans and participants. 14 Four variables capture
aspects of the default architecture (Column 1). The variable Default indicates, at the plan level,
whether the target-date series was designated as the plan’s default option; around 80 percent of
participants were in plans where target-date funds were thus designated. A second default
architecture variable, New-hire auto enrollment, indicates whether new hire automatic
enrollment was a plan feature, regardless of the type of default fund used by the plan. 15 Over 48
11

Active 401(k) participants are those who are currently contributing to their employer’s retirement plan.
Plans transferring to the Vanguard recordkeeping service for the first time during our sample period and adopting
target-date funds at that point are not included in our sample because we cannot observe plan holdings prior to the
funds’ introduction.
13
Household income and non-retirement wealth are provided by Acxiom; non-retirement wealth amounts are
imputed using zip code (zip+4) averages.
14
The Online Appendix describes dataset characteristics by year and overall.
15
Under new-hire automatic enrollment, newly eligible participants have contributions deducted automatically from
their first eligible pay (with the right to opt out); their contributions are invested in the plan’s designated default
fund. Our automatic enrollment indicator is for new hires only. Some employers have returned to “sweep” (i.e.,
automatically enroll) existing eligible non-participants. But because our dataset did not include an indicator for such
“sweeps,” any automatic enrollment estimate should be viewed as a lower bound of the actual figure.
12
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percent of participants were in plans where new hires were automatically enrolled. In total, 19
percent of participants were automatically enrolled as new hires—in other words, as employees
who joined plans under new-hire automatic enrollment (not shown in Table 2).
Table 2 here
Reenrollment, the third default variable, indicates at the participant level whether
participants were invested in a prior default fund and automatically switched by the employer to
a new default. Although reenrollment as a plan design strategy can be used in a variety of
settings, we consider it only in the case of a sponsor-directed change in default funds. 16,17 One
and one-half percent of our participant sample underwent a default fund reenrollment during the
period. A fourth default variable is Mapping, relevant when an employer discontinued a fund
option in the plan (perhaps because the employer as fiduciary no longer deemed the fund
appropriate). The Mapping variable indicates that a participant was automatically shifted from a
closing fund to the plan’s newly designated default option. 18 In our sample, just over four
percent of participants saw one or more funds discontinued and all or part of contributions
transferred to a new default fund.
In terms of target-date portfolio behavior, 41 percent of participants in the full sample
(nearly 912,000 individuals) adopted or were defaulted to target-date funds between 2003 and
2010 (Table 2, Column 1). To define target-date fund adoption, we focus on total contributions
(employer and employee) to target-date funds, since contributions are most reflective of
participants’ forward-looking intentions and are unbiased by past asset holdings. Almost 30
percent of participants were “pure” target-date fund (TDF) investors, meaning that all
contributions were directed to a single target-date fund. The remaining 12 percent of cases were
of the “mixed” target-date fund sort, meaning that these employees contributed to a target-date
16

Reenrollment refers to the process of switching participant assets and contributions to a newly-designated qualified
default investment alternative (QDIA), such as a target-date fund. Under federal regulations, participants are given
prior notice that their assets and contributions are to be transferred to the newly designated default fund and given
the right to make an alternative investment election. Reenrollments are typically undertaken upon recordkeeper
change, a change in the investment menu, or a change in defaults, although sponsors may undertake reenrollments
purely to improve portfolio diversification within the plan. See Vanguard (2008) and Mottola and Utkus (2009).
17
While we do not have a specific indicator for default fund reenrollments, we estimate this from the time series
data using two rules: (1) an employer changes the default at a given time t, and (2) within t + 6 months, all
participant contributions change from the prior to the new default.
18
We use the term “mapping” in a generic rather than legal sense. In a legal sense, “mapping” refers to the rules
governing the transfer of assets from a discontinued fund option into a new, “like” investment option. We use the
term “mapping” as it is used colloquially—to refer to the transfer of the discontinued fund’s assets into the plan’s
designated default option.
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fund along with other funds. 19 In other words, measured by total contributions, the ratio of pure
to mixed target-date investors was 2.5:1. Pure target-date fund investors were generally younger,
more female, and had low/moderate incomes and lower balances (Table 2, Column 2). Mixed
target-date fund investors had the opposite characteristics and above-average balances (Table 2,
Column 3). A point worth special note is that 42 percent of the sample was classified as “new
entrants.” As noted above, a plan entered our sample in the month it added target-date funds, at
which point all then-current participants were classified as “existing.” A “new entrant” was
anyone who entered a 401(k) plan with target-date funds included in the menu. 20
For the difference-in-difference (D-D) analysis (described in more detail below), we
consider participants who voluntarily switched to a target-date investment for all or part of their
portfolios within subsequent six months of the funds’ first appearance in the 401(k) plan. 21
These participants were subject to new target-date offerings by their employers and responded to
that offering – or “treatment” – affirmatively within the subsequent six-month period. In effect,
these participants can be thought of as workers with the strongest latent demand for target-date
funds, as they switched to the funds within six months of the funds’ introduction. Over 163,000
participants appear in the D-D sample: 69,148 were pure target-date investors (participants who
switched from other holdings to a single target-date fund), and 94,288 were mixed target-date
investors (participants who added a position in a target-date fund to their other investments).
When compared to the full sample (Table 2, Columns 1 and 4), the D-D sample is quite similar
to the full group.

Factors Influencing Participant Target-Date Fund Adoption
When a participant adopts a target-date fund, the decision may be an active choice, not
influenced by employer-designated defaults, or it can involve an employer-designated default. In
the former instance, no default designation is made; the plan sponsor thus may add target-date
funds to the menu in anticipation of (or in response to) a perceived participant need for
19

A small fraction of this group contributed to multiple target-date funds and/or multiple plan options. Also, some
mixed investors were “mixed” due to employer direction of employer contributions to company stock; we control
for this effect with an indicator for employer securities in the plan investment menu.
20
Not all new entrants are new hires. Many of the plans in our sample allow immediate eligibility for the plan to
new hires, though a minority imposes a six- or 12-month waiting period.
21
We include only those plans introducing target-date funds by June 2010 in order to observe both pre- and postintroduction effects for all observations.
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prepackaged convenience, the simplifying decision heuristic of target-date funds or the agebased rebalancing commitment device. Existing participants may reconsider their existing
portfolio choices in light of the new investment features introduced with target-date funds; new
entrants will evaluate the target-date offerings along with other funds when they enroll in their
plans. In the latter instance, where employers establish a default architecture, target-date funds
may be selected as defaults via several channels: as a default for administrative purposes, for
new-hire automatic enrollment, for reenrollment from a prior default fund, or for “mapping” of
discontinued fund options.
To assess the distinct impacts of defaults and active choice on participant portfolio
selection, we estimate three multivariate models of target-date fund adoption. Each relates a
distinct measure of target-date adoption to default, participant, plan, and market characteristics,
as in equation (1):
TDFAdopteri , j ,t = αPARTICIPANT + βPLAN + γARCHITECTURE

Here TDFAdopter i,j,t

(1)
+υi + τ t + ω j + ε i , j ,t
indicates whether individual i adopts a target-date fund (TDF) in plan j in

month t, measured using total contributions to target-date funds (employer and employee). In
Model A, we use a Probit specification where the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the
participant contributes to a target-date fund in month t (0 otherwise). The mean value of this
time-weighted adoption rate is 31.2 percent over the 2003-10 period. Model B uses OLS and the
dependent variable is the fraction of total contributions directed to the target-date fund; the mean
time-weighted value for our sample is 24.1 percent. 22 Model C uses a multinomial Logit
framework where the dependent variable is equal to zero if the participant is a non-target-date
investor (the reference category); 1 if the participant is a “mixed” target-date fund investor
(directing 1-99 percent of contributions to one or more target-date funds); or 2 if the participant
is a “pure” target-date fund investor (directing all contributions to a single target-date fund). In
Model C, the mean time-weighted proportion of pure investors is 20.1 percent; of mixed
investors, 11.1 percent. For all three models we use the full sample described in Table 2 that
includes all active participants in the 401(k) sample; this encompasses both existing participants

22

This figure includes both those holding target-date funds and those with zero holdings.
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(those in the plan prior to the arrival of target-date funds), and new entrants (those appearing in
the plan after the funds’ appearance).
Explanatory variables in equation (1) include a PARTICIPANT term which controls on a
New Entrant identifier (indicating whether a participant entered a plan since the plan began
offering target-date funds). We also take into account participant socioeconomic characteristics
including age, income, sex, job tenure, and non-retirement financial wealth. The
ARCHITECTURE vector measures aspects associated with how target-date fund funds were
introduced, including the Default, New-hire automatic enrollment, Reenrollment and Mapping
variables described above. The three-way interaction, Default*New_hire auto enrollment
*New_entrant, indicates that a plan had new-hire automatic enrollment and also used a targetdate fund as the designated default investment. In addition, we control on the number of months
since target-date funds were introduced, Months since target-date fund (and that same variable
squared and scaled by 1,000), to trace out the time path of impact of target-date fund adoption.
To account for cross-plan differences, the PLAN vector indicates the number of fund choices on
offer, a variable indicating whether company stock was available in the 401(k) plan, and an
indicator of loan availability. For reasons noted above, we also control on SA_Before which
indicates whether static allocation funds were previously offered; this serves as an indicator of
employee taste for prepackaged investment portfolios. 23

Finally, all models include a control

for the financial crisis, defined here as the period September 2008-June 2009.
Table 3 reports coefficient estimates and/or marginal effects for the three models
summarized by equation (1), while Table 4 offers predicted effects for the five distinct decisionmaking environments in which portfolio selection and target-date fund choices were made. The
first set of results in Table 4 focuses on active choices absent any default fund designations; the
four remaining options present other default configurations. The baseline measures are the
effects associated with active choice by non-defaulted participants (Table 4, Panel I); these are
the first available estimates of target-date adoption behavior independent of default effects.
During the 2003-10 period, new entrants (entering plans with target-date funds already on the
menu) had a predicted target-date adoption rate of 31.4 percent. Existing participants (in the plan

23

The econometric models also control for plan-level heteroskedasticity ( ν i ), time fixed effects ( τ t ), and industry

fixed effects, along with missing data dummies.
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when target-date funds first appeared) had a predicted target-date adoption rate of less than half
that level, at 14 percent.
The difference between new entrants and existing employees may be due to employer
outreach surrounding the menu change: when new funds are added to a plan lineup, the change is
often communicated in a brief announcement, while plan enrollment decisions generally receive
a more detailed communications effort. It might also be the result of relative inattentiveness or
inertia among existing employees, or the greater salience or novelty of plan features like targetdate funds to new plan entrants.

The process of actively choosing target-date funds also

produces a roughly equal number of pure versus mixed investors. This suggests that preferences
are not binary for the prepackaging, simplified choice or age-based rebalancing features of
target-date funds (Panel I, Columns 3 and 4). That is, the relative demand for these features is
weaker for certain investors compared to others, so that for some, target-date funds represent
only part of the endogenous portfolio selection process. 24
Tables 3 and 4 here
Some of the strongest estimated effects in Table 4 are those associated with the default
architecture of target-date funds. When employers designated target-date funds as the default but
did not automatically enroll workers into the funds, the result was higher adoption rates (Table 4,
Panel II). Among new entrants, for instance, adoption increased by over half (49 versus 31
percent), and for existing employees by more than one-third (19 versus 14 percent). This is, in
effect, a “halo” default effect associated with the employer’s designation of the funds as a default
for administrative purposes only. Several possible mechanisms might drive this “halo” default
effect. First, when target-date funds were a designated default, the employer may have devoted
greater effort or resources to communicating the funds to participants. Second, some sponsors
present their large fund menus in logical grouping known as “tiers;” in such arrangements, the
default target-date funds are usually in the first tier or grouping. Thirdly, enrolling participants
may have contacted the fund call center where an associate noted the tiering or the plan’s default
funds; this information might then serve as an anchoring device in a conversation about portfolio

24

Both Agnew et al. (2011) and Ameriks et al. (2011) find evidence that some participants choose a mixed strategy
in an effort to enhance diversification, even though the target-date funds are highly diversified multi-asset-class
funds. This view may reflect a naïve understanding of diversification or a distrust of a single fund manager and a
desire to diversify among multiple managers.
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choice. 25 Finally, the difference might represent an endogenous preference for age-based
investing among employers that selected target-date funds as a default, taking into account
workforce preferences or needs.
As expected, the most well-known use of a default, namely automatic enrollment of new
hires, did have a substantial effect on increased adoption of target-date funds (Table 4, Panel III).
The predicted adoption rate from new-hire automatic enrollment into a target-date fund was 57
percent, almost twice as large as the organic adoption rate of 31 percent among new entrants
voluntarily electing target-date funds. A notable feature, not previously noted, of automatic
enrollment is the tendency to produce nearly three times as many pure single-fund investors as
mixed (48 versus 17 percent). But even among those automatically enrolled, the demand for a
single-fund portfolio was far from universal; among some participants, a more complex portfolio
remained attractive.
Somewhat unexpectedly, employers who re-enrolled workers from a previous default
fund into the target-date saw as large a relative change as for automatic enrollment (Table 4,
Panel IV). New entrants were 71 percent more likely to adopt target-date funds as a result of
default fund reenrollment (54 versus 31 percent), and existing employees, over twice as likely
(31 versus 14 percent). Default fund reenrollments also raised pure adoption by a factor of 10,
relative to mixed adoption (predicted adoption of 66 percent for pure investors versus six percent
for mixed investors). Employer mapping of discontinued funds into a target-date series also had
a potent effect on adoption rates (Table 4, Panel V): new entrants had a predicted adoption rate
of 84 percent and existing employees 65 percent. Both outcomes imply substantial inertia with
respect to default effects from fund mapping. The relative difference between the two groups
likely reflects the increased familiarity of new entrants with target-date funds, and thus a reduced
willingness to “opt out” of fund mapping. Meanwhile, among existing employees, the predicted
probability of being a mixed target-date fund investor was 55 percent versus 26 percent for being
a pure target-date fund investor. This is likely because participants holding the discontinued
fund had multiple asset holdings, which combined with the new target-date fund creates a mixed
target-date strategy.
25

Around three-quarters of Vanguard participants enroll online and one-quarter enroll by phone. Service associates
have access to information on fund tiering and on the plan’s designated default, making this a plausible mechanism
for some participants. While service associates do not provide specific investment advice, the default fund may still
serve as a reference point in portfolio allocation discussions.
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Though the default architecture clearly had a major influence on target-date adoption and
is hence our main focus here, other factors are also worth noting. In Table 3, target-date adoption
was highest among low-balance participants and it fell with rising balances.

Younger

participants (under age 35) were more likely to adopt target-date funds, either as pure or mixed
investors. These factors suggest that workers in the earlier stages of the investment lifecycle
with less financial sophistication were more attracted to target-date funds, independent of the
default architecture effects. Another point worth noting is that target-date fund adoption rose
during the financial crisis period after controlling for default effects. This increased taste for
target-date funds during the financial crisis represented active participant choice at a somewhat
higher rate than in prior or subsequent periods.
Two other subtleties are associated with the introduction of target-date funds into a plan
menu. As indicated by the coefficient on the Months since target-date fund variable and its
square in Table 3, target-date fund adoption evolved nonlinearly over time: each month after the
funds’ introduction saw adoption rates rise by 0.6 percentage points (though at a declining rate).
This represents a pure time effect associated with the first appearance of the funds in a plan
menu, and it implies a declining impulse function. Furthermore, offering more funds in the
401(k) menu slightly dampened target-date fund adoption, and the effect was sizeable. Having
ten additional funds in the menu was associated with a five percent point reduction in the
probability of adopting target-date funds, suggesting that the appeal of target-date funds depends
on the breadth of the other investment offerings on the menu.

Treatment Effects of Target-Date Fund Introduction
We next consider worker demand for the unique portfolio features of target-date funds,
which, as noted earlier, include the prepackaged convenience element, an initial allocation based
on a simplifying decision heuristic (expected age of retirement), and a portfolio commitment
device for future age-based equity share rebalancing. For this purpose, we use a difference-indifference treatment effects model, exploiting the longitudinal nature of our panel. We select
participants observed both one month prior to the introduction of target-date funds to the plan
menu (the pre-treatment portfolio), and then again six months afterward (the post-treatment
portfolio). We consider portfolio changes separately for those who became either pure or mixed
target-date investors, and we control on elements of the default architecture to isolate the effects
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of active participant choice. Importantly, we have a natural way to control for tastes for
prepackaged investment portfolios, namely with the SA_before variable, which indicates whether
static allocation funds had been offered previously. As a result, the resulting demand for targetdate funds reflects a preference for the simplified current allocation heuristic (expected
retirement age), the future rebalancing feature, or both.
Table 5 presents investment attributes of pure and mixed target-date fund investor
portfolios before and after target-date funds entered the menu. Panel A shows the allocation of
total employer and employee contributions by major asset class including cash or principalguaranteed funds (money market or guaranteed investment contracts), bonds, balanced or targetdate funds (including traditional balanced funds and static allocation funds), U.S. equities,
international equities, and employer stock. Before target-date funds were added, investors held
more cash, bonds, and equity funds; afterward, balanced and target-date holdings rose by 22
percentage points. It is also notable that, before the new target-date funds were introduced, many
subsequent target-date investors contributed to balanced or static allocation funds; those
accounted for 58 percent of subsequent pure target-date and 31 percent of mixed target-date
contributions. These results underscore the importance of controlling on the prior structure of a
plan’s pre-existing menu design, so as to isolate the novel effect of offering target-date funds on
participant behavior. After adopting these funds, pure investors reduced their cash positions by
almost 22 percentage points and their US equity holdings by 12 percentage points; for them,
ownership of balanced and target-date fund funds rose by 42 percentage points. Mixed investors
held somewhat more aggressive pre-treatment portfolios, with only nine percent of contributions
directed to cash and bonds. Among this latter group, moving into target-date funds resulted in an
equal reduction in cash, U.S. equity, and company stock positions, but by only just over two
percentage points.
Table 5 here
Table 5 Panel B compares on a pre/post basis, three portfolio attributes for target-date
fund investors. Overall, the equity share of contributions (the percent of employer and employee
contributions directed to equities) rose across all investors: 26 equity allocations grew from 63 to
26

Equity share is the percentage of employer and employee contributions directed to U.S. and international equity
funds, company stock, and a percentage of balanced and target-date funds. The equity percentage for balanced and
target-date funds was calculated based on each fund’s holdings; it varies from fund to fund.
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76 percent of contributions, a shift of 13 percentage points. Moreover, this change was most
pronounced for pure investors, where equity allocations increased by nearly 26 percentage
points, compared to mixed investors where the increase was just over four percentage points (this
was because pure investors began with much lower equity allocations than did their mixed
counterparts). The second column of Panel B reports on a second portfolio characteristic,
changes in systematic or risk-adjusted expected returns due to target-date fund introduction. A
given participant’s systematic return is measured as the sum of the risk-free rate over the period,

r f , and that individual’s factor return, or rie,t , derived from a three-factor asset pricing model.27
The third portfolio characteristic in Table 5 refers to the change in the investor’s annualized
portfolio standard deviation, σ; the fourth is the change in the ratio of idiosyncratic portfolio risk
as a fraction of total portfolio variance, NSR / TVi ,t . 28 This last term describes how much of the
change in portfolio variance is explained by nonsystematic or non-market factors.
In Table 5 we show that systematic returns rose for both pure and mixed investors
without controlling on other factors. It is noteworthy that the resulting change in systematic
27

Factor returns are computed using a three-factor model based on US equities, US bonds, and international equities
because, as noted earlier, the target-date funds in our dataset are composed of index-based funds mirroring these
three asset classes. To calculate portfolio returns we construct a risk-loading matrix for all k investment options in
our dataset by regressing the excess return (over Treasury bill returns) for each of the k assets in our universe on
three market indices: the value-weighted CRSP portfolio, the Barclays Aggregate Bond Index (BAB), and the
Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) Europe, Australia and Far East (EAFE) Index. Our period of analysis
is our sample period, 2003-2010, and the five years prior, 1998-2003. The systematic return for each 401(k)
investment option is simply its factor exposure times the average factor returns over the period; the participant’s
factor return is simply the weighted average return of his or her factor exposures over the period. The mean returns
of our three factors (CRPS, BAB and EAFE) over the 156-month period are given by
rf = (rCRSPRF ,t , rBARF ,t , rMSCIRF ,t ) . The systematic return associated with the kth asset is its factor exposure times
e

the average factor returns over the 96 months, namely rk
Panel B of Table 6 is ri =
e

N
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r , where ωi ,k ,t is the weight of the kth fund in the ith participant’s total
e

k ,t k
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returns between pure and mixed target-date fund investors is small, despite their markedly
different initial risk exposures. For instance, on a “before” basis, those who became mixed
target-date fund investors held 22 percentage points more equity than those who moved to pure
target-date fund portfolios (70 versus 50 percent), but their annualized returns differed by only
25 basis points (5.94 versus 5. 69 percent). This is a direct reflection of the negative equity risk
premium that prevailed during the period over which our portfolio characteristics are evaluated
(1998-2010). 29 Portfolio risk levels also increased, though much more for pure than for mixed
target-date investors. We also see a drop in idiosyncratic risk, as expected, given the passive
nature of the target-date fund funds introduced.
Next, we use a multivariate model of portfolio characteristics to relate these four
measures – equity share, systematic return, portfolio standard deviation, and nonsystematic risk
share as a fraction of total variance – to participant, plan and treatment controls. We estimate
separate models for pure and for mixed target-date investors. The four outcomes are represented
by a vector, PORTFOLIO i,j,t , with an estimating equation of the following form:
PORTFOLIOi , j ,t = αPARTICIPANT + βPLAN + γTREATMENT
(2)
+ υ i + τ t + ω j + ε i , j ,t .
Model A includes just these terms, while Model B adds interaction terms to test whether specific

age groups responded differently to the target-date funds treatment. 30

For example, TDF

_treat*Young allows us to examine the specific impact of target-date fund introduction for
participants under age 35.
Table 6 presents estimated coefficients for the portfolio equity share model for pure and
mixed investors. The variable TDF_treat in Model A captures the simple change in equity
allocation after controlling for differences in participant and plan features, timing and industry
fixed effects, plan design elements, and plan-level heteroskedasticity. All else constant, pure
target-date fund investors increased their equity allocation by 20 percentage points, while the
change for mixed target-date fund investors was only 4 percentage points. Model B adds
29

Average annual returns over this period for the risk-free rate (U.S. Treasury bills) were 2.86%, with 5.96% for
U.S. bonds (the Barclays Aggregate Bond Index), 4.77% for U.S. stocks (the CRPS value-weighted index), and
4.82% for international stocks (the MSCI index of non-U.S. stocks). In other words, during this period the U.S. and
international equity risk premium were both negative (relative to U.S. bonds).
30
The models also control for plan-level heteroskedasticity ( ν i ), time fixed effects ( τ t ), and industry fixed effects,
along with missing data dummies. All models also include a financial crisis control.
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treatment interactions for participant and plan characteristics, the most important of which is
with respect to age, in view of the age-based equity glide path central to target-date funds.
Among both pure and mixed target-date fund investors, younger workers (under age 35) invested
more in equity after target-date funds were introduced (TDF _treat +TDF _treat*Young),
whereas older investors (over age 55) somewhat reduced their equity share.
Table 6 here
Figure 1 reports predicted changes in equity allocations by age (holding all other
variables at sample means). Among pure investors younger than age 35, equity allocations rose
by 41 percentage points when target-date funds were added to the menu; for pure investors age
35-54, equity allocations increased by 21 percentage points, and for those age 55+, the change
was only 0.2 percentage points. In other words, the young-old age gradient steepened by more
than 40 percentage points for participants switching all of their contributions to target-date funds.
Among mixed investors, while there was still a change in the age gradient, the relative increase
was smaller, by about 11 percentage points. 31
It is important to emphasize that these effects occurred solely due to introduction of the
target-date funds in the 401(k) plan by employers. Prior to the appearance of target-date funds,
participants choosing target-date funds could have made similar equity share choices on their
own. But they chose not to until the target-date fund “treatment” was introduced by their
employers,

32

Additionally, these estimates control for default effects, prior preference for

“prepackaged” portfolios, and, with our difference-in-difference approach, unobservable
employee traits that might have otherwise influenced these changes.
Next we consider the three other portfolio efficiency measures. As depicted in the first
two columns of Table 7, pure target-date fund investors' expected systematic returns rose by an
annual 65 basis points as a result of the switch to target-date funds. Among pure investors under
age 35, they grew by 91 basis points (68 plus 23 basis points); among pure investors age 55+, by
46 basis points (68 less 22 basis points). For mixed target-date fund investors, depicted in the
next two columns of Table 7, changes were smaller for all mixed investors and by age group.
Given the negative equity risk premium during our evaluation period, these return differences are
31

Alternatively these differences, which we describe as age-related, could be cohort-related.
Tang, Mitchell, Mottola, and Utkus (2010) show that virtually all employees could have “rolled their own”
portfolios to mimic the age-relevant target-date fund mix using funds available prior to the inclusion of the targetdate funds on the menu.
32
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likely lower bound estimates of the effects of target-date funds on portfolio returns under normal
market conditions.
Table 7 here
The middle section of Table 7 reports how expected portfolio volatility levels changed
when participants switched to target-date funds. For pure investors younger than age 35,
annualized volatility measures rose by 3 percentage points; for pure investors over age 55, they
remained essentially unchanged. The final section of Table 7 indicates how portfolio
nonsystematic risk shares changed for participants choosing the funds. Not surprisingly, there
was a substantial reduction in nonsystematic risk for pure target-date fund investors as their
contributions switched to all-indexed target-date funds. This accounted for 39 percentage points
of total variance before target-date funds; the marginal effect of shifting to target-date funds was
a negative 25 percentage points. The NSR share fell more for younger pure investors (-32
percentage points) than for older participants (-24 percentage points), and changes for mixed
target-date fund investors were smaller.

Conclusions and Discussion
Since 401(k) plans were first introduced in the US in 1981, one of their distinguishing
features has been a reliance on individual investment choice – that is, employers assumed
fiduciary responsibility for selecting fund offerings within 401(k) plans, but individual workers
remained responsible for portfolio decisions. But research on financial literacy and behavioral
biases in decision-making have raised concerns that some employees may be unable to make
effective portfolio choices, thus potentially undermining their old-age financial security. One
way in which the retirement marketplace has attempted to address this concern has been the
introduction of target-date funds to 401(k) plans. These target-date funds offer three distinct
features: a convenience or “prepackaged” aspect, a current portfolio choice based on a simplified
decision heuristic (expected retirement age), and a commitment device for future age-based
equity rebalancing.
Through the growing incidence of these funds, responsibility for portfolio decisionmaking has begun to shift away from workers and back to employer. Demand for target-date
funds has been influenced by two mechanisms: a complex default architecture, developed by
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employers and encouraged by the QDIA regulations of the U.S. Department of Labor, and active
choice by participants and reliance on the funds as a form of implicit lifecycle advice.
We seek to disentangle the effects of this complex choice environment using data from a
natural experiment, namely the introduction and evolution of target-date funds among 401(k)
plans over the 2003-10 period. Our analysis considers both adoption patterns, influenced by
default arrangements or participant active choice, as well as portfolio effects among participants
actively selecting the funds upon their first appearance in the plan menu. In terms of adoption, in
some plans, participants chose the funds based on their own decisions unaffected by any default
arrangement. In others, employers designated the target-date funds as a default investment for
recordkeeping purposes, for new hire automatic enrollment, for reenrollment from a prior default
fund, for mapping of discontinued funds, or some combination of these.

We show that

understanding how target-date funds change investor outcomes when added to a plan menu
depends substantively on the choice architecture in place at the time of their introduction.
Moreover, ascertaining whether participants who actively choose target-date funds are doing so
on account of the funds’ glide paths requires controlling for unobservable characteristics that
might influence their adoption, as well as workers’ preexisting taste for pre-packaged solutions.
Our difference-in-difference empirical approach addresses these concerns.
We have three broad findings. First, there is a latent demand for target-date funds among
workers based on voluntary choice and this is independent of default effects. New plan entrants
adopted these funds voluntarily at a (time-weighted) average rate of 31 percent over the 2003-10
period; existing employees’ take-up rate was roughly half that level. Demand was particularly
strong among workers early in the lifecycle. Participants electing target-date funds on their own,
rather than being defaulted or mapped into them, were equally likely to be pure target-date
versus mixed target-date fund investors. In other words, preferences for the features of targetdate funds among those making voluntary decisions were not simply a binary, all-or-nothing
choice. Demand for such funds was also quite resilient to equity market conditions, since active
adoption of target-date funds increased somewhat during the recent financial crisis.
Second, default constructs had a potent effect on portfolio outcomes, although the
magnitude depended on the exact features of the default arrangement. The simple designation of
a target-date fund series as a default for administrative or recordkeeping purposes – where
employees were not directly placed in the new funds – had a “halo” effect on participant
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outcomes: new plan entrants were 55 percent more likely to hold the funds compared to nondefaulted new entrants. As expected from prior research, automatic enrollment of new hires did
raise target-date adoption: they were 81 percent more likely to elect these funds, compared to an
“unguided” outcome. When employers reenrolled participants from a prior default to new targetdate default funds, adoption rates also rose by a similar amount, up 71 percent among new
entrants. When employers eliminated a fund from the menu and “mapped” participants into
target-date funds, target-date adoption rose by 166 percent among new entrants, and more than
doubled among existing employees.
Third, among participants actively switching to target-date funds when they were first
introduced, a difference-in-difference analysis confirms that the introduction of the funds in the
plan menu resulted in sizeable changes in portfolio characteristics. Particularly notable was the
large steepening of the age-equity allocation gradient, with workers younger than age 35
experiencing a 40 percent point rise in equity share; participants age 35-55 experiencing a 21
percent point increase; and no change seen for participants age 55+. Nonsystematic risk shares
also fell markedly for target-date investors of all ages. Further, we showed that systematic
returns and portfolio variance increased, particularly for younger investors. These changes in
portfolio characteristics occurred as a result of the introduction of target-date funds by the
employer, despite the fact that participants could have adopted these changes on their own before
the target-date funds appeared.
These effects provide evidence of participant demand for employer-selected investment
advice implicit in the funds’ glide paths (with the term “advice” here used in a practical, rather
than a legal sense). Our findings are robust to controls for default effects, observable plan and
participant differences, pre-existing tastes for prepackaged investment programs, and
unobservable individual characteristics. 33 We conclude that responsibility for portfolio decisions
is gradually shifting away from workers to employers through the growth of target-date funds in
401(k) plans. In default arrangements, this effect is direct: account contributions are invested in
target-date funds at the explicit direction of the employer. When participants actively choose the
funds, this effect is indirect: many participants adopt quite different allocations in response to the
33

Thus far we cannot determine whether this was mainly due to workers favoring the simplified decision heuristic
(expected retirement age) associated with the current portfolio choice, or a preference for the commitment device for
future age-based rebalancing, or some combination of both.
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introduction of the target-date equity glide paths into the plan menu. Regardless of the decisionmaking mechanism, many retirement plan investors appear to have malleable or ambiguous
preferences for portfolio choice, because of lack of financial knowledge and experience,
behavioral biases, or other reasons.
Our results also have implications for household finance more broadly. Households seem
particularly willing to rely on default or simplified advice arrangements when facing complex
and consequential financial choices. Inertia, too, is a dominant heuristic, not only in saving
behavior but in portfolio allocation decisions. Policy prescriptions in such instances might
include not only default arrangements, but also programs or services that offer simplifying
choices and/or embedded advice. An important question for future research is whether such
design principles can also inform household decisions of consequence in other domains,
including the choice of health insurance plans, taxable saving and investments, mortgage
instruments, and insurance.
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Table 1. Target-Date Fund Characteristics
A. Portfolio Allocation for Target-Date Funds by Specified Target Year

U.S.
stocks
(%)
Date of Fund
2055
63.0
2050
63.0
2045
63.0
2040
63.0
2035
62.5
2030
57.2
2025
52.0
2020
46.7
2015
41.3
2010
34.0
2005
24.0
Income
21.0
Note: As of December 31, 2010.

U.S. inflationNon-U.S. U.S. nominal protected
stocks (%) bonds (%) bonds (%) Cash (%)
27.0
10.0
0.0
0.0
27.0
10.0
0.0
0.0
27.0
10.0
0.0
0.0
27.0
10.0
0.0
0.0
26.8
10.8
0.0
0.0
24.5
18.3
0.0
0.0
22.3
25.8
0.0
0.0
20.0
33.3
0.0
0.0
17.7
40.0
1.0
0.0
14.6
40.4
10.7
0.4
10.3
43.9
17.9
3.9
9.0
45.0
20.0
5.0

B. Introduction of Target-Date Funds to 401(k) Plans

Full sample
Plans
Accounts
N
%
N*
%

Difference-in-difference
sample
Target-date fund adopters
N**
%

Plan introduced target-date funds de
475
47
1,058,189
48
39,550
24
novo
Plan added target-date funds to static
211
21
509,740
23
8,666
5
allocation (SA) funds
Plan switched from static allocation (SA)
322
32
634,482
29
115,220
71
funds to target-date funds
Total
1,008
2,202,411
163,436
Notes:
*Unique accounts over the 2003-2010 period in the full sample, including target-date non-adopters and adopters;
**Unique target-date adopter accounts over the 2003-2010 period in the difference-in-difference sample.

Source: Authors’ tabulations.
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Table 2. Descriptive Characteristics: Plans and Participants
Full sample

All

Pure TDF
Investors

Mixed TDF
Investors

Difference-in-difference
sample
All TDF
Pure
Mixed TDF
Investors
Investors
Investors

Default architecture (%)
Default
80.1
91.3
85.9
61.9
67.4
New-hire auto enrollment
48.3
60.5
45.2
40.4
53.7
Reenrollment
1.5
3.9
0.2
2.9
6.6
Mapping
4.4
5.2
17.9
24.9
18.1
Other plan features (%)
N Funds offered (mean)
28.7
28.4
25.7
23.8
23.5
Employer stock offered
45.0
42.1
56.1
50.8
39.4
Loan offered
85.5
85.1
92.5
90.0
85.2
SA_before
52.0
57.5
53.7
75.8
78.4
Participant characteristics
Log balance (mean 2010$)
9.7
8.4
10.2
10.2
9.7
New entrants (%)
42.6
78.3
42.7
N/A
N/A
Job tenure (years)
9.4
5.1
9.1
8.6
7.3
Young (<35, %)
25.3
39.3
26.1
28.7
33.4
Middle (35-55, %)
55.4
49.0
57.8
57.6
53.3
Old (>55, %)
19.2
11.6
16.1
13.7
13.3
Male (%)
56.2
54.0
57.8
53.1
50.0
HH income low (<$62.5K, %)
21.7
22.9
19.4
21.9
25.3
HH income medium ($62.5-$87.5K, %)
39.9
50.2
37.5
39.0
41.0
HH income high (>$87.5K)
38.4
26.8
43.1
39.1
33.7
Non-ret. financial wealth
Low (<$7.3K, %)
43.5
50.7
41.2
45.1
49.2
Average ($7.3K-$61.2K, %)
35.5
33.5
37.2
35.6
33.8
High (>$61.2K, %)
21.0
15.8
21.6
19.3
17.1
Financial crisis
Financial crisis (% of year)
5.7
6.1
5.3
15.1
20.3
TDF adoption (account %)
TDF investor
41.4
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Pure TDF investor
29.6
100.0
0.0
42.3
100.0
Mixed TDF investor
11.8
0.0
100.0
57.7
0.0
Observations
N plans
1,008
996
982
940
857
N accounts
2,202,411
651,396
259,393
163,436
69,148
Note: For the 2003-2010 summary of the full sample, characteristics are measured as of the final contribution
date between 2003 and 2010, including new entrants. For the difference-in-difference sample, characteristics
are measured six months after target-date fund introduction. Each observation represents one account.
See text for variable definitions.
Source: Authors' tabulations.

57.8
30.6
0.1
29.9
24.0
59.2
93.4
73.9
10.5
N/A
9.5
25.3
60.8
14.0
55.3
19.4
37.5
43.1
42.1
37.0
20.9
11.3
100.0
0.0
100.0
849
94,288
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Table 3. Determinants of Participant Target-Date Fund Adoption Patterns (full sample)

Variable
Mean

A: Probit
B: OLS
Prob. of TDF adoption
Contributions to TDFs
(Mean = 31.2%)
(Mean = 24.1%)
Marginal
Effect (%)
Coefficient
Coefficient

C: Multinomial Logit
Prob Mixe d Inve stor
Prob Pure Inve stor
(Mean = 11.1%)
(Mean = 20.1%)

Marginal Effect (%)
De fault archite cture (%)
Default (%)
62.6
0.204 ***
6.6
0.013 ***
3.6 ***
New entrant*Default
23.1
0.250 ***
8.6
0.160 ***
6.4 ***
Mos since TDF
28.8
0.017 ***
0.6
0.003 ***
0.3 ***
Mos**2 since TDF/1,000
1.2
-0.119 ***
-10.8
-0.018 ***
-6.1 ***
New-hire auto enrollment
40.4
0.109 ***
3.6
0.014 ***
1.4 ***
New-hire auto enrollment*Default
33.7
-0.073 ***
-2.4
0.019 ***
4.8 ***
New-hire auto enrollment*Default*New entrant
14.0
0.290 ***
10.1
0.080 ***
2.0 ***
New-hire auto enrollment*New entrant
15.9
-0.127 ***
-4.1
0.017 ***
1.0 ***
Reenrollment
0.7
0.573 ***
21.4
0.303 ***
35.1 ***
Mapping
2.9
1.459 ***
53.3
0.208 ***
34.5 ***
Othe r plan characte ristics (%)
N Funds offered (mean)
29.3
-0.014 ***
-0.5
-0.003 ***
-0.3 ***
Employer stock offered
45.5
-0.015 ***
-0.5
-0.028 ***
-4.2 ***
Loan offered
82.7
0.023 ***
0.8
-0.012 ***
-3.0 ***
SA_before
49.2
0.445 ***
14.7
0.097 ***
10.1 ***
Participant characte ristics
Log balance (mean 2010$)
10.0
-0.126 ***
-5.2
-0.048 ***
-4.9 ***
New entrant
32.5
0.597 ***
20.7
0.117 ***
15.9 ***
Job tenure (years)
9.9
-0.008 ***
-0.3
-0.001 ***
-0.2 ***
Young (<35, %)
22.8
0.132 ***
4.5
0.027 ***
2.1 ***
Old (>55, %)
17.1
-0.052 ***
-1.7
0.003 ***
0.1
Male (%)
55.6
0.030 ***
1.0
0.007 ***
0.3 ***
HH income low (<$62.5K, %)
21.7
-0.024 ***
-0.8
-0.001 ***
0.1 **
HH income high (>$87.5K, %)
40.3
0.014 ***
0.5
0.006 ***
-0.2 **
Wealth low (<$7.3K, %)
42.2
0.000
0.0
0.003 ***
0.5 ***
Wealth high (>$61.2K, %)
21.8
-0.017 ***
-0.6
0.003 ***
-0.5 ***
Financial crisis
Financial crisis (% of year)
13.3
0.045 ***
1.5
0.010 ***
1.1 ***
Controls
Account clustering
Yes
No
Yes
Time fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Industry fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
62,553,961
62,553,961
62,553,961
Number of clusters (accounts)
2,202,411
N/A
2,202,411
-2LogL
58,279,029
N/A
76,834,887
Pseudo-R squared / R-squared
26.7%
33.8%
34.3%
Notes: ** Significant at 0.05 level, *** Significant at 0.01 level. All regressions include time and industry fixed effects.
Probit and logit models include clustered standard errors at the account level. For variable definitions see text. Source: Authors' computations.

Marginal Effect (%)
4.4
1.0
0.4
-5.5
1.9
-4.7
3.2
-4.5
-8.1
55.4

***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

-0.3
3.1
3.0
6.8

***
***
***
***

0.8
12.0
-0.2
3.4
-2.1
0.5
-1.0
0.1
-0.3
-0.6

***
***
***
***
***
***
***
*
***
***

0.8 ***
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Table 4. Plan Choice Architecture: Summary of Predicted Effects on
Employee Outcomes (full sample)
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Prob. of TDF
adoption (%)

Total
Contributions
to TDF

Prob. of Pure
TDF (%)

Prob of
Mixed TDF
(%)

Sample mean

31.2

24.1

20.1

11.1

I. Active choice
A. New entrants
B. Existing participants

31.4
14.0

24.0
12.3

15.9
5.6

16.9
6.9

II Indirect default
A. New entrants
B. Existing participants

48.8
19.0

41.3
13.6

29.9
7.5

26.0
10.4

56.7

54.3

47.7

17.3

IV. Reenrollment to target-date fund
A. New entrants
B. Existing participants

53.6
30.6

54.4
42.6

65.6
33.0

6.0
3.2

V. Mapping to target-date fund
A. New entrants
B. Existing participants

83.5
64.7

44.8
33.1

53.5
26.4

76.6
54.6

III. Direct default to target-date fund
A. New entrants
B. Existing participants

Source: Predicted effects derived from models in Tables 3 (probability of adoption, employee contributions,
and pure versus mixed TDF adopters). "New entrants" are participants who enrolled with TDFs offered in the
investment menu; "existing participants" are participants who enrolled prior to TDFs being introduced in the
menu. For definitions of default categories, see text.

Source: Authors’ computations.
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Table 5. Pre/Post Contribution Allocations and Portfolio Characteristics
(Difference-in-difference sample)
A. Contribution Allocation (%)
Bonds
6.5
4.0
-2.5
5.7
0.0
-5.7
7.2
7.0
-0.1

Balanced/
TDF
42.1
63.6
21.5
57.6
100.0
42.4
30.7
36.9
6.2

B. Portfolio Risk/Return Characteristics (%)
Equity Systematic
Allocations
Returns
All TDF
Pre
62.5
5.84
investors
Post
75.8
6.32
Change
13.4
0.48
Pure TDF
Pre
49.5
5.69
investors
Post
75.1
6.54
Change
25.7
0.86
Mixed TDF Pre
72.0
5.94
investors
Post
76.3
6.16
Change
4.4
0.21

Portfolio
risk (σ)
0.11
0.12
0.01
0.09
0.12
0.03
0.12
0.13
0.01

All TDF
investors
Pure TDF
investors
Mixed TDF
investors

Pre
Post
Change
Pre
Post
Change
Pre
Post
Change

Source: Authors’ computations.

Cash
14.5
4.0
-10.6
21.8
0.0
-21.8
9.2
6.9
-2.3

U.S. International
Equities
Equities
26.4
5.3
20.1
5.0
-6.3
-0.2
12.0
1.4
0.0
0.0
-12.0
-1.4
36.9
8.0
34.8
8.7
-2.0
0.6

NSR/TV
31.7
12.2
-19.5
38.9
5.5
-33.3
26.5
17.1
-9.4

Company
Stock
5.3
3.3
-2.0
1.5
0.0
-1.5
8.0
5.7
-2.3
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Table 6. Determinants of the Share of Participant Portfolios in Equity
(OLS coefficients; difference-in-difference sample)
Pure TDF Inve stors
Model A
Model B

Mixe d TDF Inve stors
Model C
Model D

De fault archite cture (%)
New-hire auto enrollment
0.014 ***
0.013 ***
0.001
0.000
Reenrollment
0.047 ***
0.046 ***
-0.195 ***
-0.195 ***
Mapping
0.075 ***
0.092 ***
0.001
0.003 *
Tre atme nt
TDF_treat
0.195 ***
0.173 ***
0.042 ***
0.040 ***
TDF_treat*Young
0.145 ***
0.041 ***
TDF_treat*Old
-0.198 ***
-0.064 ***
TDF_treat*Low_income
-0.009 ***
0.000
TDF_treat*High_income
-0.037 ***
-0.006 ***
TDF_treat*Male
0.005 ***
-0.003 ***
TDF_treat*Poor_wealth
0.026 ***
0.006 ***
TDF_treat*Rich_wealth
-0.017 ***
0.006 ***
Othe r plan fe ature s (%)
N funds offered (mean)
-0.001 ***
-0.001 ***
0.000 **
0.000
Employer stock offered
-0.088 ***
-0.089 ***
0.037 ***
0.037 ***
Loan offered
0.073 ***
0.073 ***
0.004
0.004
SA_before
0.005 ***
0.004 **
0.027 ***
0.026 ***
Participant characte ristics
Log balance (mean 2010$)
0.019 ***
0.017 ***
0.023 ***
0.023 ***
Job tenure (years)
-0.001 ***
-0.001 ***
-0.003 ***
-0.003 ***
Young (<35, %)
0.028 ***
-0.044 ***
0.034 ***
0.014 ***
Old (>55, %)
-0.106 ***
-0.001
-0.094 ***
-0.061 ***
Male (%)
0.003 **
0.002
0.025 ***
0.026 ***
HH income low (<$62.5K, %)
-0.005 ***
0.000
-0.012 ***
-0.012 ***
HH income high (>$87.5K, %)
-0.002
0.019 ***
0.005 ***
0.008 ***
Wealth low (<$7.3K, %)
-0.003 ***
-0.017 ***
-0.009 ***
-0.012 ***
Wealth high (>$61.2K, %)
-0.001
0.008 ***
0.003 *
0.000
Financial crisis
Financial crisis (% of year)
0.159 ***
0.138 ***
0.040 ***
0.037 ***
Controls
Yes
Account level cluster
Yes
Time fixed effects
Industry fixed effects
Yes
Observations
138,296
138,296
188,576
188,576
Accounts
69,148
69,148
94,288
94,288
R squared
41.7%
46.5%
9.2%
9.8%
De pe nde nt me ans
Pre-treat
49.5%
72.0%
Post-treat
75.1%
76.3%
Unadjusted difference
25.6%
4.4%
Note: Separate OLS difference-in-difference models for pure versus mixed adopters.
Independent variable characteristics are described in Table 2; dependent variable means are
as shown at bottom of each column. Models include account-level clustering and time and industry
fixed effects. ** Significant at 0.05 level, *** Significant at 0.01 level.

Source: Authors’ computations.

32

Table 7. Marginal Effects of Portfolio Characteristics and Target-Date Fund Treatment (OLS ; difference-in-difference
sample)
Annualize d re turns
Pure TDF Investors
Mixed TDF Investors
Model A
Model B
Model C
Model D

Annualize d standard de viation (σ)
Pure TDF Investors
Mixed TDF Investors
Model A
Model B
Model C
Model D

Nonsyste matic risk/Total variance (NSR/TV)
Pure TDF Investors
Mixed TDF Investors
Model A
Model B
Model C
Model D

De fault archite cture (%)
New-hire auto enrollment
0.0053 *** 0.0052 *** 0.0011 *** 0.0011 *** 0.0029 *** 0.0030 *** -0.0012 *** -0.0012 *** -0.2069 *** -0.2065 *** 0.0275 *** 0.0269 ***
Reenrollment
0.0017 *** 0.0017 *** -0.0095 *** -0.0095 *** 0.0043 *** 0.0041 *** -0.0320 *** -0.0320 *** -0.0766 *** -0.0763 *** 0.1714 *** 0.1719 ***
Mapping
0.0014 *** 0.0016 *** 0.0021 *** 0.0021 *** -0.0025 *** -0.0008 *** 0.0034 *** 0.0035 *** -0.0454 *** -0.0507 *** -0.0386 *** -0.0406 ***
Tre atme nt
TDF_treat
0.0065 *** 0.0068 *** 0.0022 *** 0.0026 *** 0.0201 *** 0.0136 *** 0.0081 *** 0.0079 *** -0.2450 *** -0.2363 *** -0.0831 *** -0.0582 ***
TDF_treat*Young
0.0023 ***
0.0004 ***
0.0179 ***
0.0034 ***
-0.0860 ***
-0.0199 ***
TDF_treat*Old
-0.0022 ***
-0.0008 ***
-0.0135 ***
-0.0041 ***
-0.0016
-0.0164 ***
TDF_treat*Low_income
-0.0002 **
-0.0002 ***
0.0027 ***
0.0000
0.0223 ***
-0.0074 *
TDF_treat*High_income
-0.0007 ***
-0.0005 ***
-0.0039 ***
-0.0011 ***
0.0440 ***
0.0113 ***
TDF_treat*Male
-0.0005 ***
-0.0001 ***
0.0024 ***
-0.0002 ***
0.0064 **
-0.0128 ***
TDF_treat*Poor_wealth
0.0005 ***
-0.0001
0.0032 ***
0.0009 ***
-0.0181 ***
-0.0155 ***
TDF_treat*Rich_wealth
-0.0004 ***
0.0002 **
-0.0017 ***
0.0003
-0.0022
-0.0036
TDF_treat*Young*FinancialCrisis
0.0015 *** 0.0001
0.0013 *** 0.0011 *** 0.0069 *** -0.0034 *** 0.0054 *** 0.0036 *** -0.0022
0.0495 *** 0.0969 *** 0.1049 ***
TDF_treat*Old*FinancialCrisis
-0.0021 *** -0.0008 *** 0.0000
0.0005 ** -0.0114 *** -0.0036 *** -0.0051 *** -0.0028 **
0.0709 *** 0.0672 *** 0.1065 *** 0.1106 ***
Othe r plan fe ature s (%)
N funds offered (mean)
0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** -0.0001 *** -0.0001 *** 0.0000
0.0000
-0.0006 *** -0.0006 *** 0.0005 *** 0.0005 *** -0.0031 *** -0.0033 ***
Employer stock offered
-0.0046 *** -0.0045 *** -0.0006 *** -0.0006 *** -0.0070 *** -0.0069 *** 0.0056 *** 0.0056 *** 0.2960 *** 0.2951
0.1464 *** 0.1473 ***
Loan offered
0.0019 *** 0.0019 *** -0.0019 *** -0.0019 *** 0.0098 *** 0.0101 *** -0.0008 *
-0.0007
-0.0631 *** -0.0634 *** -0.0175 *** -0.0183 ***
SA_before
-0.0003 *** -0.0003 *** 0.0013 *** 0.0013 *** -0.0003
-0.0001
0.0045 *** 0.0045 *** -0.1259 *** -0.1265 *** -0.0439 *** -0.0434 ***
Participant characte ristics
Log balance (mean 2010$)
0.0003 *** 0.0003 *** 0.0004 *** 0.0004 *** 0.0030 *** 0.0027 *** 0.0033 *** 0.0033 *** -0.0234 *** -0.0223 *** -0.0129 *** -0.0124 ***
Job tenure (years)
0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** -0.0001 *** -0.0001 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000
-0.0004 *** -0.0004 *** -0.0005 ** -0.0006 *** -0.0004 *** -0.0004 ***
Young (<35, %)
-0.0004 *** -0.0013 *** 0.0004 *** 0.0002 *** 0.0013 *** -0.0063 *** 0.0044 *** 0.0029 *** 0.0472 *** 0.0839 *** -0.0082 *** 0.0012
Old (>55, %)
-0.0015 *** -0.0004 *** -0.0014 *** -0.0010 *** -0.0117 *** -0.0051 *** -0.0139 *** -0.0119 *** -0.0061
-0.0058
0.0068 **
0.0149 ***
Male (%)
0.0004 *** 0.0006 *** 0.0008 *** 0.0008 *** 0.0013 *** 0.0001
0.0048 *** 0.0049 *** -0.0185 *** -0.0218 *** 0.0025
0.0089 ***
HH income low (<$62.5K, %)
-0.0001 *
0.0000
-0.0003 *** -0.0002 ** -0.0009 *** -0.0024 *** -0.0014 *** -0.0014 *** 0.0106 *** -0.0009
0.0046
0.0083 *
HH income high (>$87.5K, %)
0.0000
0.0004 *** 0.0002 *** 0.0004 *** -0.0001
0.0021 *** 0.0008 *** 0.0014 *** -0.0040
-0.0277 *** 0.0005
-0.0055
Wealth low (<$7.3K, %)
-0.0002 *** -0.0005 *** -0.0004 *** -0.0004 *** -0.0009 *** -0.0025 *** -0.0018 *** -0.0023 *** 0.0127 *** 0.0219 *** 0.0033
0.0111 ***
Wealth high (>$61.2K, %)
0.0000
0.0002 *
0.0001 **
0.0000
0.0003
0.0012 **
0.0007 *** 0.0006
0.0024
0.0034
0.0049 **
0.0065 *
Financial crisis
Financial crisis (% of year)
0.0041 *** 0.0041 *** -0.0012 *** -0.0012 *** 0.0144 *** 0.0154 *** -0.0019 *** -0.0020 *** -0.2005 *** -0.2029 *** -0.0335 *** -0.0354 ***
Controls
Account level cluster
Yes
Yes
Yes
Time fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Industry fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
138,296
188,576
188,576
138,296
188,576
188,576
138,296
188,576
188,576
138,296
138,296
138,296
Accounts
69,148
94,288
94,288
69,148
94,288
94,288
69,148
94,288
94,288
69,148
69,148
69,148
R squared
46.5%
8.1%
8.2%
25.4%
28.0%
6.6%
6.7%
33.2%
33.4%
11.3%
11.4%
45.9%
De pe nde nt me ans
Pre-treat
5.69%
5.94%
0.09
0.12
38.86%
26.49%
Post-treat
17.06%
6.54%
6.16%
0.12
0.13
5.55%
Unadjusted difference
0.85%
0.22%
0.03
0.01
-33.31%
-9.43%
Note: Separate OLS difference-in-difference models for pure versus mixed adopters. Independent variable characteristics are described in Table 2; dependent variable means are as shown at bottom of
each column and in Table 8. Models include account-level clustering and time and industry fixed effects. ** Significant at 0.05 level, *** Significant at 0.01 level. Source: Authors' computations.

33

Figure 1. Change in Participant Portfolio Equity Shares: Post Minus Pre
Target-Date Fund Introduction (Difference-in-difference sample)
Pure TDF Investors

50%

40.8%

40%
30%

Mixed TDF Investors
40.6%

21.2%

20%
8.5%

10%
0.2%

0%

10.9%
4.1%
-2.4%

-10%
Younger (under 35)

Middle-age (35-55)

Older (over 55)

Old-Young

Source: Authors’ tabulations.

Figure 2. Equity Share of Participant Portfolios for Target-date Fund
Investors: Pre and Post TDF Adoption (Difference-in-difference sample)
A. Pure TDF Investors
Before

60.0

After

Account (%)

50.0
40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0

Equity Exposure

B. Mixed TDF Investors

Account (%)

20.0
15.0
10.0
5.0
0.0

Equity Exposure

Source: Authors’ tabulations.
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For Online Publication: Data Appendix: Plan and Participant
Characteristics by Year and for Entire Study Period
(Full sample)
By Year
2006
2007

Entire
Period
2003-10

2003
2004
2005
2008
2009
2010
Default architecture (%)
Default
0.0
6.1
6.5
20.2
22.3
73.9
86.9
89.6
80.1
New-hire auto enrollment
0.0
2.9
5.2
27.2
33.5
44.1
49.1
51.3
48.3
Reenrollment
0.0
0.2
0.1
0.5
0.8
0.9
0.8
1.6
1.5
Mapping
0.0
0.6
0.6
1.1
2.3
3.2
3.7
5.3
4.4
Other plan characteristics (%)
N funds offered (mean)
65.8
45.5
30.3
27.7
28.2
28.3
28.6
29.3
28.7
Employer stock offered
0.0
15.5
38.5
45.0
46.9
46.8
46.7
44.5
45.0
Loan offered
3.5
44.2
70.5
79.9
84.6
85.2
85.8
85.5
85.5
SA_before
100.0
70.8
43.8
37.0
44.3
50.4
54.2
55.0
52.0
Participant characteristics
Log balance (mean 2010$)
9.9
9.9
10.1
10.0
10.0
9.6
9.9
10.1
9.7
New entrant (%)
1.6
8.9
13.5
22.8
28.3
35.9
40.5
43.6
42.6
Job tenure (years)
4.7
7.6
9.8
9.3
9.3
9.4
9.8
10.2
9.4
Young (<35, %)
23.6
24.8
24.2
24.8
24.4
24.4
23.0
22.4
25.3
Middle (35-55, %)
63.7
61.5
60.9
59.7
59.9
58.4
58.3
57.8
55.4
Old (>55, %)
12.7
13.7
14.9
15.5
15.7
17.2
18.7
19.7
19.2
Male (%)
34.7
39.7
43.0
53.9
57.9
56.7
57.1
57.6
56.2
HH income low (<$62.5K, %)
18.5
20.4
19.4
23.3
23.4
23.3
22.0
21.0
21.7
HH income medium ($62.5-$87.5K, %)
35.5
43.9
41.3
36.8
37.4
37.1
37.6
38.0
39.9
HH income high (>$87.5K)
46.1
35.7
39.3
39.9
39.2
39.6
40.4
41.0
38.4
Non-ret. Financial Wealth
Low (<$7.3K, %)
9.5
38.1
43.6
43.7
42.3
42.5
44.6
42.1
43.5
Average ($7.3K-$61.2K, %)
43.6
35.1
34.7
34.9
34.2
34.2
35.4
36.4
35.5
High (>$61.2K, %)
46.9
26.8
21.8
21.4
23.5
23.2
19.9
21.6
21.0
Financial Crisis
Financial crisis (% of year)
0
0
0
0
0
1/3
1/3
0
5.7
TDF adoption (% of accounts)
TDF investor
0.2
4.8
14.9
19.5
25.9
35.2
39.4
44.0
41.4
Pure TDF investor
0.1
2.8
7.2
10.8
15.5
23.7
27.4
31.5
29.6
Mixed TDF investor
0.0
2.0
7.7
8.7
10.4
11.5
12.0
12.5
11.8
Observations
N plans
7
136
287
485
716
879
966
1,008
1,008
N accounts
10,150 142,130 380,325 679,188 1,137,428 1,487,507 1,556,295 1,543,320 2,202,411
Note: In individual years 2003 through 2010, characteristics are measured as of final contribution date in each calendar year for full sample
including new entrants; each observation represents one account. In 2003-2010 summary, characteristics are measured as of
the contribution date for the full sample including new entrants; each observation represents one account.
Source: Authors' computations.

